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ABSTRACT
The diffusion patterns of 3G cellular technologies indicate that the reality is not matching the optimistic estimates of
various consulting firms regarding the size of the network. What factors influence the diffusion of rapidly developing
network goods? This paper draws upon innovation diffusion literature and the early experiences of 3G mobile
technologies to examine the influence of supply-side factors on the 3G diffusion trajectory. We also propose a model
that classifies various 3G related attributes in terms of their influence on present utility vs. expected future utility and
the mechanism of influence: via 3G device vs. via 3G network. The central argument of this paper is that while the
breadth of offers has been wider in 3G compared to lower generation cellular technologies, there has been digression
rather than progress on some dimensions (e.g., bulky 3G handsets, very short battery lives, small geographical coverage,
and lower network externality effects). The problems are compounded by the lack of strategic pricing and industryregulator coordinations.
Keywords: 3G mobile communications, diffusion, supply-side, technology attributes, upgradability, utility of network
goods
1. INTRODUCTION
The diffusion patterns of 3G cellular technologies
indicate that the reality is not matching the optimistic
estimates of various consulting firms. The early
experience in Europe and Asia-Pacific indicates dismal
consumer response to 3G mobile communications. For
instance, Hutchison 3G (H3G), which launched 3G
services in the UK and Italy in March 2003, had set a
target of target of 1 million subscribers in each country
by December 2003. The company achieved only 30%
of its target in Italy and 21% in U.K. by that time
(Table 1).
This paper draws upon innovation diffusion literature
and the early experiences in Europe and Asia to
explore the connection between attributes of a
technology and its diffusion pattern. Although we
focus on 3G, the issues examined in this paper have
broad implications technology marketers.
2. SUPPLY SIDE OF TECHNOLOGY
DIFFUSION: RELEVANT THEORIES
The existing literature indicates that supply side factors
that influence diffusion of network goods include price,
breadth and depth of technology products, complexity,
positioning, government-supplier coordination and
modularity and upgrdability, degree of supply
abundance and expected size of the network (Table 2).
It should, however, be noted that these factors are not
necessarily orthogonal. In the case of network goods
such as 3G mobile communications, some of these

factors are more relevant to the device whereas others
are more relevant to the network. These attributes can
also have differential impact on the perception of
present utility and expected future utility. Table 3
classifies the attributes in two dimensions: devise
specific vs. network specific and present utility vs.
expected future utility.
The demand for a network good is a function of the
expected size of the network (Katz and Shapiro 1994).
Too small new market may result in the failure of a
new technology (Lin 2003). The expected size of the
network is a function of various factors including price
of the technology product, quality, degree of
compatibility
with
previous
generations
of
technologies, and upgradabality.
Suppliers can modify product characteristics and price
structure to fit the needs of a market segment
(Robertson and Gatignon 1986). The price of a
technology influences consumers’ adoption timing
(Kamakura and Balasubramanian 1988) and the rate of
adoption (Jain and Rao 1990) at the micro-level and for
a network good, the demand and the market potential
(Kalish and Lilien 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1994) at the
macro-level. Since the network externality is positively
related to the network size, the number of users has a
higher significance than the intensity of use for
network goods. For networks that require two part fees,
a reduction of the fixed component is thus a more
appropriate way to stimulate the growth of the network
than a reduction in variable costs (Perrot 1995).
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Table 1: 3G Mobile networks in selected economies
Launched in
Service
provider(s)
and
technology
Number of
subscribers
(Date)

Hong Kong
January, 2004
H3G (W-CDMA)

Japan
September 2001
DoCoMo (W-CDMA)
KDDI (CDMA)

Italy
March 2003
H3G (W-CDMA)

U.K.
March 2003
H3G (W-CDMA)

3,000 (February 1,
2004)

DoCoMo: 2 million (January,
2004)
KDDI: 13 million (October
2003)
US$77.8 (October-December
2001)

210,000 (December
2003)

300,000
2004)

ARPU

Mason’s (1990) study, on the other hand, provided
empirical support that product attributes and not cost
affect the adoption decision. For rapidly developing
technologies such as mobile phones, modularity and
upgradability have a strong impact on the diffusion
pattern. Rosenberg (1982) found that if a technology is
upgradable, it allows a firm to offer product
innovations continually that users can integrate into
their current product configuration. He argues that
users will be reluctant to purchase products that cannot
be upgraded and rapid technological change further
Factor

(January

Euro 79 (2003)

increases the reluctance since their investments become
obsolete under such conditions (Rosenberg 1982).
Upgradability is found to be one of the major factors
that influence the selection of a desktop computer. PC
buyers are concerned about the possibility of upgrading
the processor, adding the memory, availability of drive
bays for additional hard drives (Grier and Bryant 1998).
Product standardization and modular upgradability also
affect and are affected by network externality and
compatibility requirements (Kotabe et al. 1996).

Table 2: Supply side factors influencing the diffusion of network goods
Impact on innovation diffusion
The case of 3G

• Incompatibility with lower generation phones

Expected size of network
(NS)

Influence network externality effects

Modularity
Upgradability (MU)
Price (PR)

Allows users to integrate innovations
continually
Influences:
• Adoption timing
• Rate of adoption
• Market potential
Multiple versions/standards increase
complexity
Slow growing and fast declining
diffusion pattern under supply restriction.
Increase choice and value
Inadequate coordination leads to failure.

and

Number
of
versions/standards (NV)
Degree
of
supplyabundance (SA)
Depth and breadth (DB)
Industry-government
coordination (IG)

and PCs.
• Too small coverage in some countries
Cellular
technologies
lack
consumer-level
upgradability
• Higher prices. Suppliers focused more on
reducing variables prices (VPR).

Uncertain standards and complexities of 3G
applications
Shortage of 3G handsets

Communication/promotion
(CP)
Other characteristics (OC)

Positioning influences attractiveness.

3G has a wide breadth of uses
• Market fragmentation
• Supply-side crowd
• Unrealistic expectations of governments
H3G’s confused positioning

Communication/promotion
(CP)
Other characteristics (OC)

Positioning influences attractiveness.

Size, battery life, reliability of devices and network,
etc.
H3G’s confused positioning

Modular upgradability and its benefits are also
illustrated by Sun’s SPARCstation 10 series.
SPARCstation enables users to increase system
performance by plugging in faster microprocessors and
memory modules as they become available.
SPARCstation 10 series can also be upgraded easily to
multiple processing and other future technologies. The
SPARCstation 10 provided integrated services digital

Size, battery life, reliability of devices and network,
etc.

network (ISDN) capabilities as a built-in feature.
Moreover, SPARC modules and bus architecture can
accommodate advances in microprocessors technology.
Sun also offered “no penalty upgrades” to its users-the price of an upgrade plus user investment in an
existing system would be equal to the price of a new
system (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993).
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Inadequate coordination among firms and governments
is another source of failure of a new technology (Lin
2003). The failure will also imply the inappropriateness
of the industrial policy to other firms and they can
avoid that failure by not following the policy (Lin
2003). The diffusion pattern of telecom-related
products is also a function of the focus of national
industrial and technological policies on fostering and
strengthening this sector (Beise 2001, p. 263).
The degree of supply-abundance also influences the
shape of diffusion curves. For instance, Simon and
Sebastian (1987) found that a diffusion curve exhibits
slow growing and fast declining (that is, negatively
skewed) pattern under conditions of supply restriction.
Past research has also found that variety and
uncertainty of multiple versions increase complexity
(Frizelle 1998). A technology’s possibility of forking
into numerous versions increases the uncertainty. For
instance, UNIX in the 1970s was broken into several
proprietary formats (Kogut and Metiu 2001), which
increased its complexity.
In the case of radical innovations, firms with greater
depth and breadth in their product portfolio tend to be
more successful (Sorescu et al. 2003). Broader and
deeper product portfolio increases consumer choice
and hence value of technologies offered by a company.
For instance, breadth of product line is found to be
positively related to consumers’ workstation purchase
decisions (Kaplan 1991).
Suppliers can also influence the adoption rate of a
product by communicating ideas through advertising
and promotion (Narasimhan and Mendez 2001; Rogers
1995) and setting fashions (Abrahamson 1996). Like
all other products underpositioning, overpositioning,
confused positioning and doubtful positioning (Kotler
2003, p. 311) will slow down the adoption rate.
Table 3: A two-dimensional representation of
supply side factors influencing 3G diffusion
Present Utility
Device Specific

Network Specific

PR, DB, CP, NV,
OC (Size, battery
life, reliability of
device, etc.).
PR, DB, CP, OC
(e.g., reliability of
network).

Expected Future
Utility
MU, NV, FPR,
OC (Size, battery
life, reliability of
device, etc.).
NS, FPR, OC
(e.g., reliability of
network).

3. SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS INFLUENCING
THE DIFFUSION OF 3G MOBILE
COMMUNICATIONS
3G cellular technologies are characterized by different
types of network externality compared to lower
generations. Whereas second generation (2G) phones
could communicate with first generation (1G) phones
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as well as with fixed phones, this is not the case with
3G phones. Only 3G devices can exploit combined
voice/picture capabilities of 3G networks and lower
generation mobile phones and many PCs could be
excluded from such application networks (Lehrer et al.
2002). Limited geographical coverage in most
countries has exacerbated the problem. Lack of
coverage hindered the initial success of FOMA in
Japan, NTT DoCoMo's 3G service launched in October
2001. In Italy and the U.K., H3G’s coverage started
with half the population (Norton, Leslie P 2002). Even
by the early 2004, H3G offered 3G services to only
55% of the Italian population (Taaffe 2004).
In a survey conducted by ChangeWave Alliance, the
Number 1 concern about 3G services of 18% of the
respondents was too expensive services and that of
another 4% was too expensive handsets. Consider the
prices of 3G handsets. In Korea, SK Telecom and KTF
had set the price of 3G handsets from US$581-$830 in
2003(Business CustomWire, December 28, 2003). In
U.K., immediately after the launch of 3G
services,H3Ghad to reduce the price of its handsets by
half to pounds 199 which was still much higher
compared with the "free" phones offered by 2G
operators to those signing up to their monthly plans
(Economist.com 2003).
Not only the fixed costs but also variables costs of 3G
are expensive. Higher average revenue per user
(ARPU) of 3G services reflects unattractive variable
costs. In Italy, for instance, ARPU from 3G services
was Euro 79 per month in 2003 which compares with
2G ARPU of euro27 in Europe (Taaffe 2004). In Japan,
NTT DoCoMo reported that the mean 3G revenue per
user in April – June, 2002 was $65.43 a month (Georgi
2002). In July 2003, 3’s UK customers spent an
average of £45 a month -much higher than its rivals’
£25-£35 (Payton and Bowen 2003).
In an attempt to make 3G services more attractive, the
operators have reduced variables costs for some
attributes. In U.K. a
new tariff introduced by
Hutchison 3G in June 2003, offered subscribers 500
minutes for $40 per month, which compares with the
plans of the incumbent 2G operators which averages
$72 for 400 minutes (The Economist, September 20,
2003). In Hong Kong, Hutchison offers three basic
service plans to customers at monthly charges of
US$34 (Business CustomWire, January 19, 2004). To
stimulate 2G consumers to sign up, NTT DoCoMo cut
3G fees by up to 55% for existing subscribers
(Kakenaka 2002).
The wide breadth of uses of 3G has not translated into
improvement on each dimension. In the ChangeWave
Alliance survey, 4% respondents were concerned about
current technology’s capability to carry high-quality
calls (Business CustomWire, November 19, 2003).
Subscribers complain of lost calls, bulky handsets that
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were awkward to handle and inadequate battery life. In
Italy, 15% of early customers took their handsets back
(Payton and Bowen 2003).

otherwise homogeneous European cellular market into
different licensing regimes, networks and services
(Wallage 2000).

H3G's pre-launch brand-building campaign, designed
to “cultivate curiosity” could not achieve its goal
(Payton and Bowen 2003). Hutchison also made too
many claims and too frequent change of the positioning
of its brand, resulting in confused positioning.
Hutchison, for instance, first launched a huge
advertising campaign promoting the video capabilities
and high-speed internet access of 3G handsets. In
September 2003, Hutchison started promoting its 3G
services as the cheapest ways to make voice calls
instead of touting advanced features such as
videoconferencing and Web-browsing (The Economist,
September 20, 2003, Ramstad et al. 2003). In fact, the
killer application of 3G has become voice
communications (Payton and Bowen 2003).

Second, cellular operators got into heavy debt because
of expensive 3G licenses postponed 3G investments.
For instance, Vodafone paid about £ 15 billion to
acquire 3G mobile licenses in the U.K., Germany, Italy,
Holland and Spain, which doubled its debt level to
GBP 13.2 billion in November from GBP 6.64 billion
in March 2000 (Naik 2000). Many operators asked
governments to ease various requirements and reduce
costs (Latour 2002). A petition signed by 2000
European businessmen in April 2001 asked
governments in Germany, the U.K. Italy and other
countries to return 3G auction proceeds to operators
and conduct new auctions (Ryan 2001).

In the ChangeWave Alliance survey, the number 1
concern about 3G services of 17% of the respondents
was the reliability of technology and equipment
(Business CustomWire, November 19, 2003). Many
3G subscribers are reported to carry their 2G handsets
as back-ups. Hutchison 3G mobile in Australia
received several complaints of calls dropping out not
being able to deliver video and Internet service on the
3G handsets (Business CustomWire, December 28,
2003).
The slow growing diffusion pattern of 3G is can also
be attributed to the shortage of 3G ready handsets
(Business CustomWire, December 2, 2003). Hutchison
also failed to launch the pre-pay service due the lack of
suitable handsets. Vendors like Nokia, Motorola, and
Ericsson could not ease the supply-side bottlenecks to
ensure the availability 3G ready handsets for WCDMA services. Even 2.5G handsets were seriously
delayed by Nokia (Reinhardt et al. 2001).
Many operators around the world enjoy supplier-level
upgradability in the cellular network. Economies with
CDMA-based 2G networks such as South Korea,
Brazil, India and Mexico can easily upgrade to 3G in
the form of CDMA2000 (The Economist 2002).
Thanks to its CDMA-based 2G standard, South Korea
was able to launch the 3G network as early as in 2000.
Consumer benefit of the supplier-level upgradability in
the cellular network, however, has been minimal.
Consumers, for instance, are required to buy a new
handset for 3G services. 2G handsets thus cannot be
upgraded. There is thus no “no penalty upgrades”
(Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993) in cellular networks.
In the 3G mobile industry, there seems to be the lack of
proper coordination among governments and mobile
players. First, the lack of coordination resulted in
market fragmentation. The European Commission for
instance, allowed individual governments to make their
own decision on 3G spectrum. Such move converted

Third, the lack of government-industry coordination
also resulted in supply-side crowd in the 3G industry.
For instance, consider the European 3G cellular market.
In September 2002, Germany had four 3G competitors,
the U.K. had six, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and
Italy each had five, and Spain had four (Latour and
Delaney 2002).
These problems are compounded by a lack of policies
to foster 3G sector and unrealistic expectations from
national governments. For instance, Hutchison faced
problem in getting the building permits needed to set
up base stations for 3G in Sweden. The Swedish
government also specified the requirement of 3G
coverage of 99.9% of the Swedish population (Latour
2002).
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